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OVERVIEW — Nearly 18 million people rely on employer-provided
retiree health benefits to fill gaps in Medicare’s coverage or to provide
basic insurance until they reach Medicare age. Rising costs have led many
employers to limit benefits, require participants to pay a larger share of
the costs, or stop offering coverage at all for workers who have not yet
retired. This background paper describes recent developments in retiree
health benefits, possible future trends, and policy options for slowing the
erosion of coverage or providing alternative ways for retirees to meet their
expected medical expenses.
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Health Benefits in Retirement:
Set for Extinction?
As the “baby boom” generation nears retirement, much federal policy
discussion has been devoted to future pressures on Social Security, Medi-
care, and Medicaid long-term care financing. Even if the funding prob-
lems for these programs can be solved, many future retirees may have
difficulty maintaining their standard of living, because of dwindling pen-
sion benefits and low personal savings. Adding to these strains is the
steady erosion of employer-provided retiree health benefits, which have
been a key component of income security in retirement.
In 2004, 14.2 million retirees received health coverage through their former
employers; another 3.6 million people were covered as dependents un-
der a family member’s retiree plan. Early retirees may rely on employer-
provided benefits as their primary source of coverage until they qualify
for Medicare, usually at age 65. Many early retirees might be unable to
find affordable coverage if they had to shop for it on their own because of
their age and frequent health problems. For Medicare beneficiaries, re-
tiree health plans help pay for required cost sharing and cover services
excluded from Medicare. Even after including the new prescription drug
benefit, Medicare’s coverage gaps can expose beneficiaries who do not
have supplemental coverage to enormous expenses over a lifetime.
Whether enrolled in Medicare or not, many retirees have relied on the
financial support offered by retiree health benefits. However, steadily ris-
ing costs, changes in accounting rules, and other factors have led many
employers to curtail benefits, tighten eligibility rules, or even eliminate
retiree coverage altogether. While some of these changes have affected
participants who have already retired, the greater impact has been on
people who are still actively employed. Employers are less frequently
offering, as many once did, generous lifetime coverage for current work-
ers once they reach retirement age. Workers who were planning to retire
before age 65 may have to delay their retirement because nonemployer
coverage can be hard to obtain and very costly. Those who expected re-
tiree plans to supplement their Medicare coverage may have to seek al-
ternatives that are more expensive or less comprehensive, or they may
have to set aside savings to meet future health care costs on their own.
This background paper describes the fundamentals of retiree health ben-
efits and reviews data on recent coverage trends as well as the likelihood of
further erosion of benefits. It then considers three basic approaches to help
current and future retirees with the burden of health care costs: (i) provid-
ing better incentives for employers to maintain retiree health benefits,
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(ii) developing tax-favored savings arrangements that could help retirees
meet their own expenses, and (iii) improving access to alternative sources
of health insurance for retirees without employer-provided plans. Each of
these options might provide some help to people who have already retired
or who expect to retire soon. However, with medical costs growing rapidly
and personal savings rates at historically low levels, much broader ap-
proaches may be needed to assure retirement security for future retirees.
BASICS OF RETIREE COVERAGE
Retiree health benefit programs commonly treat retirees who are Medicare
beneficiaries differently from those who are not yet receiving Medicare.
Many data sources on retiree health distinguish participants under age 65—
“early retirees”—from those aged 65 or older. However, some retirees do
become eligible for Medicare as a result of a disability before turning 65.
Conversely, a few people over 65 do not qualify for Medicare because they
did not work or did not pay enough Medicare taxes during their working
lives. This paper will generally refer to non-Medicare and Medicare retir-
ees, except when cited statistics use an age-based classification.
Although most employers that offer retiree health coverage offer it to both
groups, a 2005 survey of large employers found that 6 percent covered
only non-Medicare retirees and 1 percent covered only Medicare retir-
ees.1 When plans cover both groups, they usually provide different ben-
efits to each. For non-Medicare retirees, the employer plan will be the
primary source of health insurance. Often the benefits and plan choices
are similar to those provided for active workers, although retirees may
be required to pay a different share of their premiums. For Medicare re-
tirees, the plan “wraps around” Medicare coverage, paying some or all of
the required cost-sharing for Medicare-covered services and picking up
the cost of some services not covered by Medicare.
Some employers have allowed or required retirees to join a Medicare
Advantage (formerly Medicare+Choice) plan. These plans, chiefly health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) or preferred provider organizations
(PPOs), contract with Medicare to provide the full scope of Medicare ben-
efits and usually offer reductions in cost-sharing and other supplemental
services. An employer may negotiate a benefit package and premium for
its retirees that would be different from what the Medicare Advantage
plan might offer to other, nongroup Medicare beneficiaries.
Employers have been distinguishing between Medicare and non-Medicare
retirees for many years, but there has recently been a dispute over whether
this practice is legal. In 2000, a federal circuit court ruled that the distinc-
tion violated the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
Although this ruling only applied in one federal circuit, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) initially decided to apply it
nationally. Employers and unions protested, arguing that if employers could
not offer reduced benefits to Medicare retirees they would respond by
Retiree health benefit
programs commonly
treat retirees who are
Medicare beneficiaries
differently from those
not receiving Medicare.
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cutting benefits for non-Medicare retirees. In effect, they contended, the EEOC
rule would not improve benefits for Medicare retirees but might instead force
benefits for all retirees down to the lowest common denominator.
In response, the EEOC reversed itself; in 2004 it planned to publish in the
Federal Register a new rule explicitly allowing employers to offer different
benefits for retirees with Medicare or with coverage under some similar
state programs. Before the rule could be issued, AARP obtained a district
court injunction forbidding publication on the grounds that the rule vio-
lated the circuit court’s previous decision. The district court involved has
since reversed itself, but the injunction remains in effect pending the out-
come of an appeal by AARP.2
The Senate-passed version of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003
would have amended the ADEA to allow different benefits for Medicare
and non-Medicare retirees. This provision was not included in the con-
ference agreement on the bill, but the report of the conferees indicates
that they “reviewed the ADEA and its legislative history and believe the
legislative history clearly articulates the intent of Congress that employ-
ers should not be prevented from providing voluntary benefits to retirees
only until they become eligible to participate in the Medicare program.”3
Employer-provided benefits are actually less costly for retirees with Medi-
care, because Medicare covers most of their expenses. A 2004 survey of
firms with 1,000 or more workers found that premiums for retirees under
age 65, including both employer and employee shares, averaged $487
per month, compared to $262 for older retirees.4 Much of the spending
for Medicare retirees has been for one major service category Medicare
has not traditionally covered: outpatient prescription drugs. Employers’
costs for these retirees will be affected by the new Medicare prescription
drug benefit; see “Effect of the Medicare Drug Benefit,” page 13.
Eligibility for Benefits
Employers may offer retiree benefits to only a portion of their workforce or
may provide different benefits for different classes of workers, such as sala-
ried versus hourly, union versus nonunion. Increasingly, employers are of-
fering different benefits to workers hired at different times. An employer
may offer one set of benefits to employees hired before a given date and
may reduce or simply eliminate those benefits for workers joining the com-
pany more recently.
In most cases, in order to receive employer-paid benefits in retirement,
retirees must reach a specified minimum age, must have worked for the
company for some minimum number of years, or both. Minimum service
requirements have been increasing in recent years. For example, one study
estimates that almost 90 percent of firms with retiree benefits were pro-
viding coverage to Medicare retirees with five or fewer years of service in
1984. By 2001, this number had dropped to about one-quarter of firms,
many of which reported they planned to impose longer service require-
ments for future retirees.5
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A second key requirement is that the worker usually must retire from the
firm offering the benefits. A worker who moves from one firm to another
before retirement retains entitlement to pension benefits already accrued
but may lose health benefits from the previous job. This limitation can mean
that people nearing retirement may lose benefits they had been counting
on. Older workers tend to change jobs less frequently than younger ones; 6
job tenure may be longer in the larger firms more likely to offer retiree
health benefits. But the lack of portability or “vesting” rights may be an
important gap for some older workers leaving their jobs early because of
corporate downsizing or other events. This issue will be considered fur-
ther in the context of pensions and health benefit regulation (see page 17).
Retiree Share of Costs
Most employers require retirees to contribute to the costs of their cover-
age. Figure 1 (right), drawn from a survey of employers with 1,000 or
more workers, shows the distribution of required pre-
mium contributions for new retirees aged 65 and older.
Only a few employers pay the retiree’s premiums in full,
whereas about one in five require the retiree to pay the
entire premium. This latter type of arrangement is
known as an “access only” plan: the retiree is simply
given the opportunity to buy coverage through the em-
ployer group plan. (Note that these rules often apply
only to recent or future retirees; people who have al-
ready retired from the same firms may be paying a much
smaller share of their premiums.)
Access only plans, while costly for the retiree, may still
be advantageous. Many retirees may pay lower pre-
miums than they would have to pay for equivalent cov-
erage outside the group because the administrative
costs of a large group are lower than those for an indi-
vidual. While the data are scarce, one recent estimate
suggests that administrative costs amount to about 10
percent of large group premiums.7 In comparison, up
to 35 percent of premiums for individually purchased
Medicare supplemental insurance (Medigap plans)
may go to administrative costs; costs may be even
higher for nongroup insurance sold to non-Medicare
retirees. In addition, non-Medicare retirees with an ac-
cess only plan do not face the barriers to coverage they
might encounter if they sought  nongroup insurance,
such as preexisting condition exclusions, denial of cov-
erage for health reasons, or higher premiums charged
to applicants with  health problems.
FIGURE 1
Distribution of Large Employers by
Share of Premium Paid by Retirees, 2005
Note: Premiums for retiree-only coverage for full-time employees retir-
ing at age 65 on or after January 1, 2005.
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation and Hewitt Associates, Prospects
for Retiree Health Benefits as Medicare Prescription Drug Cover-
age Begins: Findings from the Kaiser/Hewitt 2005 Survey on
Retiree Health Benefits, December 2005; available at www.kff.org/
medicare/med120705pkg.cfm.
21 to 40% of premium
41 to 60% of premium
61 to 99% of premium
Retiree pays entire premium
1 to 20% of premium
Retiree pays none of premium
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One possible drawback of access only plans is that healthier retirees
may be able to find cheaper coverage outside the group, leaving only
the sicker employees participating in the group plan.8 With fewer healthy
beneficiaries to offset the costs of those who are sicker, rates for the group
coverage might increase, potentially driving even more low-risk
retirees out of the pool. This possible cycle of rate increases and deterio-
ration of the average risk level in an insurance pool is known as a
“selection spiral,” or, in the extreme case, a “death spiral.” Ultimately
the employer group could wind up with only a few very high-risk retir-
ees paying very high premiums.
When the employer pays at least part of the premium for retirees, its
contribution may take the form of a specified percentage of the pre-
mium or a fixed dollar amount. Many employers that have been paying
a fixed percentage of the premium have now imposed limits on the ex-
tent to which their contributions will grow in the future. A plan with a
“premium cap” may define the amount by which the employer’s pay-
ment will increase each year; if premiums rise more rapidly, the retiree
must pay the difference. Or the employer may set an absolute dollar
limit on the amount it will pay toward premiums in the future. For ex-
ample, an employer that is now paying 60 percent of a $2,000 premium
for a Medicare retiree, or $1,200, might say that it will never pay more
than $1,500 in any future year. If premiums continue to rise after this
cap is reached, the employer will be paying a steadily smaller share of
the total.9
As recently as 1991, virtually no employers used premium caps.10 By
2004, among retirees of firms with 1,000 or more employees, 54 percent
of retirees under age 65 and 51 percent aged 65 or older were in a capped
plan. In over 80 percent of these capped plans, the employer’s contribu-
tion had already reached the cap or was expected to do so within the
next three years. 11 (It should be noted that an employer that has im-
posed a cap may choose to raise or even waive it in the future.)
Another way of limiting an employer ’s future responsibility for
premium contributions is through a retiree medical account (RMA) in
which the employer typically credits the worker with a certain dollar
amount for each year of service. Once the employee retires, the accu-
mulated amount can be drawn on to pay for retiree health coverage or
other expenses. An RMA is a “notional” account; that is, the employer
isn’t actually depositing money anywhere but is simply crediting the
worker with a specified amount to be made available once expenses are
actually incurred.
Tax Treatment
The basic tax rules for retiree health benefits are similar to those for health
benefits provided to active workers. The employer’s contribution to
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premiums is a deductible business expense for the employer and is not
counted toward taxable income for the retiree. Any required premium
contribution or cost-sharing payment by the retiree is not tax deduct-
ible, unless the combination of premiums and other medical expenses
is sufficient to qualify the taxpayer for the limited itemized medical ex-
pense deduction.12
Although the same restriction theoretically applies to
active workers, many can pay their share of premiums
and other medical expenses with pre-tax dollars through
cafeteria plans under section 125 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code. (One type of section 125 arrangement, a flex-
ible spending account, is described in the discussions of tax-preferred
savings, page 22.) No equivalent arrangement is available to retirees;
they must pay all premiums and other costs with after-tax income. (One
recent commentary has suggested allowing retirees to pay premium con-
tributions with pre-tax dollars, placing them on the same footing as ac-
tive employees.13)
Accounting Standards
One commonly cited turning point for retiree health benefits was the
imposition of new accounting rules for private firms beginning in 1992.
Standards for accounting and financial reporting by private companies
are set by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB); uniform
standards are meant to assure that investors can rely on the accuracy
and comparability of financial statements.
Until the 1990s, private companies were required to show the unfunded
amount of their expected future costs for pensions as a liability in their
financial reports but were not required to include future costs for other
retiree benefits, including health care. Instead they simply showed
current-year spending for these benefits as an expense. FASB standard
FAS 106 required companies to show estimated costs for future retiree
health benefits as a liability in their financial statements (but not on the
balance sheet itself) for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1992.14
Because reporting a sizeable new liability could affect credit ratings,
many companies responded by dropping benefits for future retirees or
adopting other cost-cutting measures. Some benefit changes affected
costs immediately; others, such as premium caps, made future liabili-
ties more fixed and predictable in comparison to the indeterminate li-
ability of open-ended plans. Still, as health care costs increase, reported
liabilities are continuing to grow. One recent analysis of a sample of
Fortune 500 companies that included future retiree health costs on their
financial statements found that most reported liabilities rising faster than
inflation between 2001 and 2003; a few showed increases of 50 percent
Retirees must pay all premiums and
other costs for their health cover-
age with after-tax income.
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or more in just two years.15 Firms’ concerns are likely to be exacerbated
by a proposed change in FASB rules that would require retiree health
liability to be more conspicuously displayed by moving the amount from
a footnote to the actual balance sheet.16
The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), which sets stan-
dards for state and local governments, has only recently adopted rules
comparable to FAS 106. Larger government units will have to show li-
abilities for future benefits on statements for fiscal years beginning af-
ter December 15, 2006; the smallest units will have up to two more years
to comply. The effects are not yet known but are likely to be substantial,
because many governments provide more generous benefits to retirees
than private firms. One actuary has estimated that total liabilities na-
tionwide could be as high as $1 trillion.17 Changes in some governments’
reported liabilities could affect their bond ratings and ability to borrow,
giving them a strong incentive to reduce benefits.
COVERAGE TRENDS
In 2004, 17.8 million people had retiree health benefits (Figure 2,
below).18 Of these, 12.9 million were Medicare beneficiaries, representing
one-third of the total Medicare population. Nonelderly Medicare benefi-
ciaries have a much lower coverage rate than the elderly: 17
percent as opposed to 35 percent.19 One factor might be that people
who receive Medicare as a result of disabil-
ity leave employment before meeting
minimum service years or other plan eligi-
bility criteria. About 47 percent of non-
Medicare retirees (3.1 million) had retiree
health benefits. Coverage rates may be
higher for early retirees because they worked
in industries most likely to offer coverage or
because the availability of health benefits was
itself a major factor in the decision to retire
early. Another 1.5 million people were cov-
ered as dependents under non-Medicare re-
tirees’ plans. (The coverage rate for this group
cannot be ascertained, because the universe
of dependents of non-Medicare retirees
cannot be identified using Current Popula-
tion Survey data.)
It might be expected that retirees with
employer-provided coverage would also
have higher incomes than other retirees,
because they might also receive higher
FIGURE 2
Population of Retirees and Dependents with
Employer-Provided Health Benefits, 2004
Note: Some people reporting coverage through their former employer may be purchas-
ing COBRA continuation coverage, rather than receiving retiree coverage.
Source: Author’s analysis of Current Population Survey, 2005 Annual Social and Eco-
nomic Supplement.
Medicare retirees 
(10.8 million)
Medicare
dependents
(2.1 million) 
Non-Medicare 
retirees  
(3.4 million)
Non-Medicare 
dependents  
(1.5 million)
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pensions and other benefits. As Figure 3 (above) shows, however, nearly
one-fourth of people with retiree coverage have incomes below 200 per-
cent of the poverty threshold ($18,120 for an elderly individual or $22,860
for an elderly couple in 2004).20
Erosion of Retiree Health Benefits
The number of medium and large private employers offering retiree health
coverage dropped precipitously between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s,
possibly in response to the change in FASB accounting rules, then declined
more gradually over the ensuing years.21 The only data series that continu-
ously tracks changes for employers of all sizes is the Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey (MEPS) conducted by the Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality. Table 1 (next page) shows some key changes between 1997
and 2003, the latest year available.
Comparatively few small or new private employers have ever offered cov-
erage; retiree health benefits have been largely confined to medium and
larger employers and those in business for a long time. Among mid-sized
FIGURE 3
Population of Retirees with Health Benefits
by Ratio of Family Income to  Federal Poverty Threshold, 2004
Source: Author’s analysis of Current Population Survey, 2005 Annual Social and Economic Supplement.
Medicare Non-Medicare Total
34% 45%
42% 33%
24% 22% Under 200% of poverty
200 to 399% 
of poverty
400% of 
poverty  
or more
37%
39%
24%
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establishments and those in operation for at least 20 years that offered
coverage to nonelderly retirees in 1997, more than half had dropped it by
2003. Coverage dropped less sharply among the largest firms.
Public sector employers of all sizes are much more likely than private
firms to offer retiree coverage. The coverage declines shown in Table 1
largely reflect changes by smaller local governments; nearly all state gov-
ernments and most larger local governments still provide benefits.
There was no statistically significant decline in coverage at companies
with any union employees. However, more recent surveys have indi-
cated that some unionized companies have terminated benefits for new
hires.22 Increasingly, unions have had to negotiate changes in benefits
and cost-sharing: for example, General Motors (GM) and the United
Auto Workers (UAW) recently announced an agreement under which
higher-income retirees will have to pay premiums, deductibles, and co-
pays for the first time.23
Figure 4 (next page) shows trends in the percentage of Medicare benefi-
ciaries and non-Medicare retirees with coverage since 1991. The changes
in employer policies have not yet had a major effect on coverage of cur-
rent Medicare retirees, presumably because many had already retired
* A private establishment is a single work location; one large firm can have multiple establishments.
Source: Author’s calculations based on 1997 and 2003 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS).
Under 65 65 and older
1997 2003 1997 2003
Private Establishments* 11% 7% 7% 7%
Number of Employees
Less than 10 3% 0% 0% 1%
10 to 24 7 2 2 2
25 to 99 12 2 2 4
100 to 999 24 10 10 9
1000 or more 52 42 42 40
Number of Years in Operation
Less than 5 2 0 0 0
5 to 9 3 1 1 1
10 to 19 5 1 1 1
20 or more 23 10 10 11
Union Presence
No union employees 9 4 4 4
Has union employees 39 37 37 38
State and Local Governments 52% 42% 42% 40%
TABLE 1
Percentage of Establishments Offering Retiree Health Benefits,
by Establishment Characteristics, 1997 and 2003
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before those changes took effect. However, there was a significant reduc-
tion in coverage of current non-Medicare retirees between 1991 and 2004.
It should be noted that the coverage figures here are heavily affected by
the number of federal annuitants covered under the Federal Employees
Health Benefits (FEHB) program—1.8 million in 2003, or about
one-eighth of all retirees with coverage through their own former
employment.24 If these retirees could be factored out (they cannot
using the CPS data), the figures might show slightly greater drops in
coverage rates.
Prospects for the Future
Although employer coverage has not yet declined markedly among people
who are now retired, changes already adopted by employers mean that
fewer currently active workers will have employer-sponsored health ben-
efits when they reach retirement age. Some people think that the biggest
cutbacks have already occurred and that benefits are likely to be more
stable in the near term. Others believe that more employers—perhaps
especially government units affected by the new GASB rule—will con-
tinue cutting benefits in the years to come.
Employers’ health care costs have been rising rapidly, both for active
workers and for current retirees. One survey of large employers found
that their costs for retiree care rose by 10.3 percent between 2004 and
2005; this is slightly more than the 9 percent increase in costs for active
workers found in another large employer survey covering the same
period.25 While costs for both groups are obviously of concern for em-
ployers, there are several reasons that employers might be more prone to
focus on benefits for retirees than those for active workers.
First, if employers are downsizing, they may be covering fewer active
workers and more retirees. The experience of the federal government
illustrates this trend: the ratio of civilian employees to annuitants and
survivors went from 1.46 in 1990 to 1.14 in 2003.26 Assuming similar trends
at other large employers, retiree costs are likely to account for a steadily
larger share of employers’ overall health care spending. Moreover, while
expenses for current employees are incurred in order to recruit and retain
the kind of workers the employer needs, expenses for retirees are simply
a sunk cost.
Second, it may be easier to cut future benefits for active workers than to
cut current benefits for the same workers. A change in the current health
plan is felt immediately, whereas a change affecting benefits to be pro-
vided many years in the future is not. Younger employees may not care
whether future benefits are eliminated, especially if the distant promise
of retiree health care is replaced by more immediately attractive ben-
efits like child care or tuition support. Even employees much closer to
retirement may not be focusing on future health benefits. One recent
FIGURE 4
Percentage of Retiree
Population with Employer-
Provided Health Benefits,
1991, 1998, and 2004
Source: Author’s analysis of Current Popula-
tion Survey, March 1992 and March 1999
Supplements, and 2005 Annual Social and
Economic Supplement.
Note: Figures for non-Medicare retirees ex-
clude dependents.
0
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50%
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survey of workers aged 45 to 64 found that only 28 percent recalled
ever asking for or receiving information on retiree health coverage. Only
18 percent reported that employers had notified them of any recent re-
ductions in retiree benefits, although employer surveys indicate that most
had indeed curtailed retiree health benefits during the period covered.27
On the other hand, some factors may make future cuts less likely. First,
many of the employers still offering generous coverage are unionized,
public sector, or both; their ability to impose changes unilaterally may be
limited. Second, even though the costs of covering health care are increas-
ing, employers that are planning further downsizing may retain health
benefits as an incentive for older workers to take early retirement, leav-
ing the employer with a younger and less costly workforce. Some em-
ployers might also be reluctant to consider further cuts simply out of
concern for public relations or employee goodwill. Finally, the potential
effects of the new Medicare drug benefit are uncertain. It is unclear whether
the new benefit will help stabilize employer coverage of Medicare retir-
ees over the long term or promote further erosion.
Whatever the employers that now offer retiree health benefits decide to
do, the workforce is gradually shifting from employers that are offering
benefits—chiefly older, large, unionized firms and governments—to newer
employers that have never adopted retiree health coverage. This means
that overall coverage rates among retirees are likely to decline in the fu-
ture. Meanwhile, retirees who retain coverage may gradually pay more
of their own costs. For example, one analysis estimates that, if a firm has
adopted a premium cap, rising premiums in excess of the cap will mean
that the employer would be paying only 10 percent of retirees’ health
care costs by 2031.28
Effect of the Medicare Drug Benefit
Prescription drugs have been a major component of employer spending
for Medicare retirees. One study reports that drugs accounted for 45 per-
cent of employers’ costs for this group in 2001; more recently, some For-
tune 500 companies have estimated that drugs made up 56 to 64 percent
of spending for Medicare retirees.29 Therefore, the new Medicare prescrip-
tion drug benefit (known as “Part D” to lawmakers) will likely have an
impact on retiree plans.
Standard part D coverage is defined as follows. The enrollee will pay:
■ The first $250 in expenses for covered drugs.
■ 25 percent of expenses between $250 and $2,250.
■ 100 percent of expenses above $2,250, until the enrollee’s total out-of-
pocket spending for the year reaches $3,600; after this catastrophic
limit is reached, the drug plan will pay all costs. (The participant’s
exposure to full costs in the $2,250 to $3,600 range has come to be
called the “doughnut hole.”)
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The initial deductible and the other coverage thresholds will all be sub-
ject to annual increases after 2006 based on growth in participants’ per
capita drug spending.
The prescription drug benefits under current retiree plans are often su-
perior to the standard Medicare prescription drug coverage. Most plans
offered by employers with 1,000 or more workers in 2005 had no sepa-
rate deductible for drugs, and few had a benefit limit.30
Employers have four basic options for dealing with the overlap of the
Part D benefit and retiree benefits. Employers with different plans or
groups of retirees may choose a different approach for each group.
1) The employer can continue its current drug plan
as an alternative to part D. If this plan is at least
actuarially equivalent to the part D coverage—pro-
viding roughly equal benefits, taking into account
required premiums and cost-sharing—the plan may
qualify for a federal subsidy. In 2006, this subsidy will cover 28 percent
of spending between $251 and $5,000 for each participant. The Con-
gressional Budget Office has estimated that the cost of this subsidy will
be lower than the cost to Medicare if retirees dropped their coverage
and shifted to part D.31 The subsidy thus produces net federal savings
while providing at least some incentive for employers to continue plans
that are often more generous than the minimum part D benefit.
2) The employer can convert its drug plan to a wraparound benefit,
which would fill the holes (that is, the doughnut hole and the cost-
sharing requirements) in the part D benefit in the same way that retiree
plans have traditionally filled gaps in other Medicare benefits.
3) The employer can pay retirees’ premiums for an approved Medicare
prescription drug plan or Medicare Advantage plan. Or the employer’s
own retiree plan could apply for recognition as a part D plan and receive
the full Medicare payments made to such plans, instead of the more lim-
ited subsidy for plans deemed equivalent (option 1, above).
4) The employer can drop drug coverage altogether, possibly replacing it
with improvements in other health benefits or some unrelated benefit(s).
Employers choosing to retain current benefits and seek the federal subsidy
were required to apply by October 31, 2005. As of December 22, 2005, most
retirees with employer-provided drug benefits were in plans that had quali-
fied for the subsidy or whose applications were still being processed. The
major federal retirement programs, FEHB program and Tricare, are con-
tinuing their coverage without the subsidy (which would simply have trans-
ferred funds from one federal agency to another). As shown in Table 2 (next
page), relatively few retirees were in plans that chose to qualify directly as
a part D plan or provide wraparound coverage.
Most retirees with employer-sponsored
drug benefits are in plans that have
qualified for a federal subsidy.
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Enrollees
(millions)
Continued employer plan with federal subsidy 5.9
Federal subsidy application still in process 0.6
Employer-based part D plan or wraparound 1.0
Federal retirees 3.1
Other* 0.5
TABLE 2
Number of Medicare Enrollees with Continued
Employer-Based Drug Coverage, as of December 2005
* Continuing without subsidy or noncalendar year plans not yet receiving subsidy.
Source: “More than 21 Million Medicare Beneficiaries to Be Covered for Prescription
Drugs as of January 1, 2006,” press release, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, December 22, 2005; available at www.os.dhhs.gov/news/press/2005pres/
20051222.html.
It is uncertain whether the drug subsidy will
prevent employers from reducing or drop-
ping drug benefits over the long term. Many
employers are still uncertain about what
strategy they will adopt in future years. A
survey of employers with 1,000 or more
workers found that 82 percent were “very”
or “somewhat” likely to continue drug ben-
efits and accept the federal subsidy in 2007.
Only 50 percent report that the same is true
for 2010, whereas 28 percent do not know
what they will do.32 At least some employ-
ers may have continued existing benefits for
the time being only because they are locked
into their current plan through agreements
or contracts with health insurers and phar-
macy benefit managers. Others may have
found the alternatives too difficult to imple-
ment in the short time available.
Over time, many employers might find that it is more costly to continue
their current drug plans, even with the federal subsidy, than to pay retir-
ees’ premiums for an outside part D plan and provide wraparound cov-
erage.33 The trade-offs are likely to vary, depending on the outside plans
available where retirees live, the employer’s tax situation, and other fac-
tors. Moreover, many employer plans that qualify for federal subsidies
now might not in the future: if growth in employer contributions is lim-
ited by an already-established premium cap, the plan may cease to meet
the actuarial equivalency test for the subsidy.34
If more employers do modify or drop their drug benefits in the coming
years, some may not find it worthwhile to continue any form of health
coverage for Medicare retirees. Employer-provided coverage has gener-
ally been more comprehensive than individual Medigap plans, but the dif-
ference has been chiefly attributable to drug coverage. In 2002, per capita
benefit payments by employer plans for Medicare beneficiaries were 58
percent higher than per capita payments by Medigap or other nonemployer
plans. If only nondrug expenses are included, the difference shrinks to 20
percent.35 Employers might eventually find it less cumbersome to help re-
tirees with premiums for an outside Medigap or Medicare Advantage plan,
rather than continue offering their own supplemental plan.
PROTECTING RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS
When an employer offers a worker some benefit in the future, such as a
pension or health coverage, this benefit is part of a total compensation pack-
age for the services the worker is performing in the present. At least in
theory, the worker is accepting lower wages today in return for something
of value to be furnished at the time of retirement. The trade-offs are made
Background Paper
February 8, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 16
explicit when the terms of employment are subject to collective bargaining:
when a union and an employer negotiate a new or amended contract, cur-
rent wages, current benefits (such as health or dependent care), and future
benefits are all on the table. Other workers may rarely negotiate their com-
pensation in this direct way. But employers are implicitly balancing differ-
ent components of compensation to develop an overall package that will
attract the kind of workers the employer seeks to hire.
A promise of pension benefits is rather straightforward. The employer
may offer a “defined benefit”: on retirement, the worker will receive so
many dollars a month per year of service, or some specified percentage
of his or her average wages during, for example, the last five years of
service. Or the employer may offer a “defined contribution”: each month,
the employer will deposit a fixed amount of money into a retirement
account, such as a 401(k) plan or other pension fund, from which the
worker may draw later in life.
Defined benefits are risky for employers. An actuary can estimate how
much money the employer needs to set aside today in order to make
expected payouts in the future, given assumptions about likely invest-
ment earnings, life expectancy of workers and their survivors after retire-
ment, and other factors. But any of these assumptions may prove wrong,
and the employer may find itself in the future having to spend more than
it anticipated. Under defined contribution plans, on the other hand, the
workers bear the risk. What the employer pays into the retirement fund
is fixed, but how much the worker can eventually draw out depends on
how well the fund performs during the years before retirement. (Retirees
also bear the risk, unless they purchase an annuity, that if they live longer
than expected they will exhaust their savings.)
Because of the risks involved in defined benefit plans, some employers
have been shifting from defined benefit pension plans to defined contri-
bution plans or to a sort of hybrid known as a cash balance plan.36 For
example, IBM has just “frozen” its pension plan, effective in 2008. Work-
ers will remain entitled to the pension benefits earned during past years
of service, but in the future the company will only contribute to the em-
ployees’ 401(k) accounts.37 Many other employers have imposed partial
freezes, closing the defined benefit plan to new workers or shifting work-
ers below a certain age to a defined contribution system.38
Retiree health benefit plans have almost always taken the form of defined
benefits. Plans that offer a specified package of health coverage in the fu-
ture are even riskier to the employer than defined benefit pensions, because
the employer’s ultimate costs will depend on medical care inflation, changes
in utilization of services, and other unknowns. Employers have moved to
reduce the degree of uncertainty about their future obligations by imposing
caps on future premium contributions. But a capped health plan is still a
defined benefit: an offer to pay $100 a month toward health premiums is
very much like an offer to pay $100 a month in retirement income.
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However, there is a key difference between pension and health plans. Pen-
sion plans can be changed only prospectively. An employer can reduce or
even eliminate any promise of pension benefits for services rendered by
workers in the future, but it remains obligated to pay out the benefits prom-
ised in return for past years of service. Employers have no such obligation
with respect to retiree health benefits. Unless these benefits are specifically
protected, for example by a union contract, the employer can at any time
modify or even eliminate health benefits previously
offered to current workers or even currently provided
for people who have already retired.
The rest of this section will briefly compare the cur-
rent rules and protections for defined benefit pen-
sion plans and health benefits and will then consider
whether any of the principles governing pensions might be applied to re-
tiree health benefits. The next section will review possible savings options
that might make retiree health benefits more like defined contribution plans.
Regulation of Pensions and Retiree Health Benefits
Retiree health plans, like health plans for active workers and other employee
benefits, are subject to regulation by the Department of Labor under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. Whereas ERISA
includes detailed requirements for pension plans, requirements for “employee
welfare benefit plans,” including health plans, are minimal. First, employers
must provide workers with a summary plan description (SPD), which spells
out the terms of the plan, and must provide written notice of any later changes
in the plan. Second, plan administrators have a general fiduciary responsi-
bility to manage the plan for the benefit of its participants.
Following are some of the key differences between basic ERISA protec-
tions for pension plans and for retiree health benefits.
Vesting and portability — Employees participating in a pension plan are
“vested” after a specified period of service with the firm; for example, five
years after the start of employment. If the employee completes the vesting
period but then leaves the firm before the established retirement age, he or
she retains the right to whatever benefits he or she has already accrued. For
example, suppose a plan provides for payment at age 65 of $100 a year for
each year of creditable service. If a younger employee leaves the firm after
10 years of service, he or she remains permanently entitled to receive $1,000
a year after reaching 65. There is no such vesting for health benefits; if an
employee entitled to retiree health benefits leaves the firm before retire-
ment, he or she may lose all entitlement to retiree health coverage.
Modification or termination of plan for active workers — An em-
ployer can change its pension plan only prospectively, not retroactively.
For example, an employer that was offering $100 a year for each year of
creditable service might declare that, from now on, employees will re-
ceive only $50 per year of service, or it might eliminate pension benefits
Unless retiree health benefits are spe-
cifically protected, for example by a
union contract, the employer can at any
time modify or even eliminate them.
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altogether. But employees who have some years of service at the time the
change is announced remain entitled to $100 a year for the years already
accrued. There is no such protection for retiree health benefits. An em-
ployer can notify its active workers at any time that it no longer intends
to provide the benefits previously offered.
Modification or termination of plan for people already retired — Once
an employee retires, the employer is permanently required to provide the
pension benefits promised during the employee’s years as an active worker.
The same is true for retiree health benefits if the plan in effect on the date of
retirement promises permanent benefits. But many SPDs include blanket
language allowing the employer to modify the benefits after retirement.
Funding — Employers must prefund a defined benefit pension plan, set-
ting aside sufficient cash or investments in a secure fund to assure that
the plan will be able to pay all promised benefits. (Under defined contri-
bution plans, the employer has already fulfilled its promise when it de-
posits money in the worker’s retirement account.) Most private plans of-
fering defined benefit pensions are insured through the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC). The plan pays an annual premium for
each participant, plus an additional premium if the plan is underfunded,
that is, if it has insufficient assets to meet projected
future obligations. If an employer goes bankrupt or
otherwise defaults, the PBGC pays promised ben-
efits up to fixed limits per participant.
The protection of pension plans is by no means perfect. Some employers
have underfunded their plans, using overly optimistic assumptions about
fund performance or future costs, or delaying payments to the funds in
order to improve their apparent short-term financial performance. If too
many of these employers ultimately default, the PBGC might have insuffi-
cient funds to meet its obligations, raising the possibility that a federal bail-
out might be needed.39 Even if the PBGC can meet its obligations, limits on
individual payouts mean that not all retirees will receive the full benefits
they were promised. Congress is considering measures to strengthen fund-
ing requirements and other features of the pension system.
Employers are not required to prefund health benefits, although doing so
can reduce the amount of the future liability they must report in financial
statements, and there is no backup arrangement if employers default. As of
December 2005, employers included in the Standard & Poor’s 500 had funded
just 21.7 percent of their expected costs for health and other nonpension
retiree benefits, compared to 88.3 percent of their expected pension liability.40
Options for Protecting Health Benefits
In theory, it would be possible to subject retiree health benefits to the same
regulatory scheme that applies to defined benefit pension plans. However,
the risks and burdens imposed by current pension rules are a key factor in
the shift to defined contribution plans. Mandating similar protections for
health benefits would almost certainly lead employers to cut those benefits
Employers are not required to prefund
health benefits, and there is no backup
arrangement if employers default.
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even more rapidly than they are now. An alternative might be a voluntary
system that would give employers better incentives to prefund their re-
tiree health plans in exchange for firmer guarantees to future retirees.
Funding — Current law makes it much more difficult to prefund retiree
health benefits than to prefund pensions.
The principle vehicle for prefunding health benefits is a tax-favored trust
arrangement known as a Voluntary Employee Benefits Association (VEBA).
A VEBA may be established by employers, groups of multiple employers,
or unions. Employer contributions to the VEBA are a deductible business
expense, and distributions to pay for employee and retiree benefits are also
tax-exempt. Some VEBAs also receive contributions from employees, al-
though employee contributions come from after-tax income. 41
One prominent recent example of a VEBA is a new independent trust
formed as part of the contract agreement negotiated by GM and UAW in
October 2005. Over time, GM will contribute $3 billion to the VEBA; funds
will help pay part of the new premiums and cost-sharing required for
current and future retirees and help maintain stable benefits in the fu-
ture. Active workers will not pay into the VEBA directly but will contrib-
ute indirectly by forgoing some scheduled future wage increases.42
VEBAs have two important drawbacks. First, because of past abuses in the
use of VEBAs—to shelter profits or make inappropriate investments—Con-
gress in the 1980s sharply restricted the tax-exempt amounts employers
can contribute. In the case of retiree health benefits, employers can make
contributions to cover current retiree costs as well as projected future ex-
penses for employees who are still working. However, their contributions
for current workers must assume that expenses for these workers after re-
tirement will be the same as expenses for current retirees. The employer
may not make any allowance for future inflation or utilization changes.
This limit means that employers that are still promising specific health ben-
efits (as opposed to a fixed contribution) can only prefund a fraction of
their true expected future costs, even though the FASB rule requires them
to report full expected costs as a liability. The contribution limit could be
eliminated, but doing so might entail at least some risk of reviving the
abusive practices that led to its imposition in the first place. This could be
reduced, at the price of added administrative complexity, through stronger
scrutiny of actuarial assumptions used in determining contribution levels.
Second, VEBAs formed by for-profit employers must pay taxes on invest-
ment earnings. (Income of a VEBA formed by a government, nonprofit
entity, or union can accumulate compounding income tax-free.) To fully
prefund benefits, an employer must set aside much more than if the ac-
count were allowed to earn compounding interest tax-free. Allowing tax-
exempt income for VEBAs could help equalize treatment of health and
pension prefunding.
If changes in VEBA rules promoted broader use of these arrangements,
one result could be a significant increase in federal tax expenditures. This
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might be justifiable if the result were stronger protections for beneficia-
ries. Which of the rules now applied to pension plans might reasonably
be applied to health plans?
Limiting benefit cuts — As under pension rules, employers could be
forbidden to reduce health benefits already offered to future retirees. This
would be very burdensome for employers that are still offering a fixed
package of benefits, as opposed to those providing only a specified fu-
ture dollar contribution. However, if VEBA contribution rules were loos-
ened, it might be fair to require employers using these arrangements to
guarantee that participants would receive the benefits assumed in deter-
mining their contributions.
A more drastic option would be to prohibit employers from modifying
benefits for people who have already retired. In the 109th Congress, H.R.
1322 would forbid all but the smallest employers from changing benefits
and would require employers that have already reduced benefits for cur-
rent retirees to restore the benefits in effect on their retirement date. The bill
also would provide for hardship exemptions, as well as a federal loan guar-
antee program to help employers meet the costs. Applying this require-
ment to current retirees, even just prospectively and not retroactively, would
be extremely costly for employers that have not prefunded the benefits.
Portability and vesting — This principle of the pension system would
be difficult to apply to retiree health benefits. Under a defined benefit
pension plan, the employer’s promise to pay a certain sum of money in
the future is binding for a vested worker even if he or she moves to an-
other employer before retirement. Under a retiree health plan, the em-
ployer usually promises to make a contribution for the specific group
health insurance plan or for plans the employer offers. Vesting would
mean allowing a worker who had left the employer group some years
earlier to rejoin the group on reaching retirement. In addition, in plans
that do not yet use a premium cap to lock in the amount of the employer’s
future payment, vesting for former employees would mean an open-ended
liability for growth in medical care costs.
The concept of vesting might be more workable for plans under which
the employer is crediting fixed dollar amounts per year of service to a
notional retiree medical account or to a health reimbursement account
(HRA, described in “Saving for Health Costs in Retirement,” page 21).
These amount to nonportable savings arrangements. Allowing the worker
to carry over credited amounts on changing employment could be justi-
fied on the grounds that the amount credited to the worker for each year
of service was part of the worker’s compensation for that year. On the
other hand, employers might argue that allowing portability would take
away one tool they have for retaining experienced workers.
Protecting benefits in bankruptcy — When an employer reorganizes
under a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, it can often rescind health
benefits promised to its retirees; this has occurred in several recent bank-
ruptcies of airlines and other companies.43 In the 109th Congress, S. 329
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would provide some limited protection by requiring such employers to
pay retirees an amount equivalent to 18 months’ worth of health benefits.
One recent commentary has suggested providing broader protection
through a Health Care Benefit Guarantee Corporation, which would pro-
vide an employer-funded safety net comparable to that provided by PBGC.44
However, given current concerns about the potential need for a federal
bail-out of the PBGC, it seems doubtful that lawmakers will be eager to
clone the concept.
It is unclear how many employers would be willing to sign on
to an arrangement that provided more attractive funding op-
tions in exchange for stronger benefit protections. Even if some
would participate, it is likely that they would strictly limit their
future commitments; for example, premium caps might be set
even lower than the revocable caps now imposed by many firms.
While this might seem self-defeating, it could be argued that, if employers
had to guarantee benefits, they might be more realistic about what they
were really prepared to deliver. And, if benefits were reduced as a result,
active workers could at least be sure about what they would be getting and
could make other plans to meet their likely future costs.
SAVING FOR HEALTH COSTS IN RETIREMENT
People entering retirement without employer health benefits—and even
many people with employer benefits that are capped or otherwise leave
the retiree exposed to high costs—will need substantial savings to meet
their health care costs in retirement. One recent analysis estimated that
an average couple retiring without employer benefits at age 65 in 2005
would need $190,000 in savings to cover future Medicare premiums and
cost-sharing as well as costs for non-Medicare services. This estimate as-
sumes average life expectancy and health status.45
Another more elaborate set of projections (dating from before enactment of
the Medicare drug benefit and using a range of different assumptions about
life expectancy, premiums, and other cost increases) estimated that an indi-
vidual retiring at age 65 in 2003 with some employer-provided benefit would
have needed between $37,000 and $150,000 to cover lifetime costs; some-
one with no employer coverage would have needed between $47,000 and
$1,458,000.46 Neither set of estimates takes into account possible costs for
nursing home and other long-term care, most of which is covered neither
by Medicare nor by employer-sponsored or nongroup Medicare supple-
mental coverage. Of course, these projected savings requirements are in
addition to whatever people need to save in order to meet their other liv-
ing expenses in retirement.
Under current law, there are a limited number of vehicles that allow em-
ployees to accumulate tax-favored savings specifically for health expenses,
either on their own or with some employer contribution (see next page).47
People entering retirement
without health benefits will
need substantial savings to
meet their health care costs.
Continued, page 23 ➤
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Flexible spending accounts (FSAs) allow em-
ployees to designate a sum to be deducted from
their wages and deposited into the FSA; the
amount deposited is tax-exempt. The employee
may draw on the account to pay coinsurance
or deductible requirements under the health
plan, or to pay for medical services not covered
under the plan. However, the funds must be
used to pay expenses during the year they are
deposited or shortly thereafter. (Under a May
2005 Treasury ruling, an employer may now al-
low workers to use the FSA for expenses in-
curred up to two and one-half months after the
end of the year.)
Health savings accounts (HSAs) are a new
option created by the Medicare Modernization
Act of 2003. An employee may make pre-tax
contributions to an HSA, and any employer
contributions are deductible for the employer
and tax-exempt for the employee. An employee
may contribute to an HSA only if he or she is
covered by a high-deductible health plan
(HDHP)—one with a minimum deductible of
$2,500 for an individual or $5,000 for a family—
and has no other health insurance. (Separate
plans for dental, prescription, or other services
are permitted.) Contributions during a year
may not exceed the lesser of the HDHP deduct-
ible or a statutory limit. Amounts in an HSA
may be used to pay the deductible or other
cost-sharing under the HDHP or to pay for any
other qualified medical expenses.* Unused
amounts can be carried over, with interest in-
come tax-exempt. The balance in an HSA is
available for medical expenses permanently, re-
gardless of whether the employee ceases to par-
ticipate in the HSA/HDHP arrangement,
changes jobs, or retires. (An NHPF background
paper provides more information on HSAs.†)
One other arrangement, the Medicare Advan-
tage medical savings account (MSA) is quite
similar to the HSA/HDHP option. Medicare
beneficiaries can establish an MSA if they agree
to obtain their Medicare benefits through a
high-deductible plan with a Medicare contract;
as no such plan has ever contracted with Medi-
care, this is a dormant option.
In health reimbursement arrangements
(HRAs), an employer can make tax-exempt con-
tributions to an HRA; employees cannot supple-
ment these contributions. Amounts in an HRA
can be drawn on at any time to pay for qualified
medical expenses, and unused amounts may be
carried over into future years. However, the em-
ployer is free to decide what specific categories
of expenses may be covered, and the employer
may or may not allow the worker to continue
drawing on the HRA balance if he or she changes
jobs. Like retiree medical accounts, HRAs are
usually notional: the employer is not actually de-
positing money anywhere but is simply credit-
ing the worker with a specified amount to be
made available as expenses are actually incurred.
Employee pay-all VEBAs are a variant of the
VEBA arrangements previously described in
which only the employee pays into the VEBA
and the contributions are not tax-deductible.
However, interest income on the VEBA is tax-
exempt, unlike income of VEBAs established
by for-profit employers. Distributions from the
VEBA are also tax-free. (The VEBA may be
thought of as similar to a Roth IRA, which also
involves after-tax contributions but tax-free
earnings and distributions.)
* Qualified medical expenses are those that would be deductible
under the itemized medical expense deduction, including
premiums for health or long-term care insurance, cost-sharing,
and most other medical expenses.
† Beth Fuchs and Julia A. James, Health Savings Accounts:
The Fundamentals, National Health Policy Forum,
Background Paper, April 11, 2005; available at www.nhpf.org/
pdfs_bp/BP_HSAs_04-11-05.pdf.
Tax-Preferred Savings for Health Expenses
Background Paper
February 8, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 23
Each of the available vehicles offers an opportunity to make pre-tax con-
tributions for future expenses, accumulate tax-free investment earnings,
and/or make tax-free withdrawals when expenses are incurred. How-
ever, each has important shortcomings as a way of saving for medical
costs in retirement. FSAs allow only limited contributions meant for im-
mediate use and are not available to retirees. HRAs and employee pay-
all VEBAs may or may not be portable after a job change or retirement.
HSAs are portable, but they are available only to employees willing to
accept a high-deductible health plan in place of more comprehensive ben-
efits. Finally, all of these arrangements are available for active workers’
current health spending, not just anticipated costs after retirement. Many
participants are likely to use up much or all of the balances before reach-
ing retirement age.
There are a variety of proposals to modify the current options in order to
promote more saving for future health needs. President Bush’s 2004 bud-
get proposal would have allowed up to $500 per year in unused FSA
balances to be carried over, apparently indefinitely, or shifted to a retire-
ment account or an HSA.48 Many similar proposals have been offered in
the 109th Congress. Because FSAs were designed for immediate use, they
are not expected to earn interest income; if they did earn interest, any
such income would not be tax-exempt.
Two bills in the 109th Congress, H.R 2063 and H.R. 3873 would allow
tax-free rollovers from 401(k)s and other retirement funds to HSAs. This
option would only be available to people qualifying for an HSA under
the current rule that requires a high-deductible health plan. Another
proposal, H.R. 3075, would allow establishment of an HSA without a
high-deductible plan. An individual could deposit up to $8,000 a year
in the account; the limit would be indexed for inflation. President Bush’s
fiscal year 2007 budget would retain the high-deductible health plan
requirement but raise HSA contribution limits and allow higher contri-
butions for chronically ill employees.
Another approach would be to retarget non-health savings vehicles to
promote their use for health expenses. Currently, 401(k)s and other funds
allow tax-exempt contributions and can earn tax-free investment income;
however, amounts withdrawn from the fund after retirement are taxable.
Several proposals would allow tax-free withdrawals to pay health ex-
penses. At least one would also waive current limits on annual 401(k)
contributions when the contribution was intended for future health costs.49
More sweeping proposals would create entirely new vehicles for retire-
ment health savings. One recent plan calls for Medicare Health Accounts:
workers could agree to have up to 1 percent of wages deducted on a pre-
tax basis and placed in a savings account to be maintained by Medicare;
the account could be drawn on later in life, again tax-free, for expenses
Medicare does not cover. A survey of adults aged 50 to 70 in a family with
➤  Continued from page 21
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at least one working member found that 69 percent would be interested in
this arrangement.50 The proposal apparently does not contemplate that the
savings fund would earn any interest or other income. Another option
would be a separate 401(k), IRA, or other private savings arrangement ear-
marked specifically for health costs. Like other retirement savings options,
these funds would grow through compounding investment earnings. 51
Although improved vehicles for health savings could be helpful for some
future retirees, these proposals may need to be considered in the context
of the broader retirement savings problem. Only 62 percent of workers
report that they are currently saving any money for re-
tirement, and many of those who are saving see them-
selves as behind schedule in preparing for retirement
needs. Factors reportedly limiting the ability to save in-
clude everyday living expenses, child care costs, and
current medical spending.52 Possibly better education
about future health needs and stronger incentives for saving would en-
courage some of these workers to set aside more money if they are able to
do so. But it could also be that new options for health savings would be
taken up largely by higher-income people who are already making the
maximum contributions to other forms of tax-favored savings.
Proposals that would allow tax-free withdrawals from savings for health
care, while withdrawals from savings for other expenses are taxable, raise
a second question: why should health spending be preferred in this way?
Some people would contend that current tax incentives for health insur-
ance and health spending may encourage unnecessary or inefficient care,
and that the tax system should not be used to promote some kinds of
consumption rather than others. On the other hand, it could be argued
that the tax system already privileges health spending by active workers;
these proposals would merely extend the same preference to retirees.
ALTERNATE SOURCES OF
RETIREE HEALTH COVERAGE
Retirees who are losing access to employer-sponsored health benefits, or
those leaving firms that never offered the benefits in the first place, face
high costs and other barriers to obtaining basic health coverage or a Medi-
care supplement. Policymakers could consider alternative ways of help-
ing retirees obtain affordable coverage.
Access to Insurance for Non-Medicare Retirees
Retirees who seek insurance in the nongroup market may face very high
premiums, especially if they have a history of medical problems; may be
offered coverage only with preexisting condition exclusions or other re-
strictions; or, in most states, may be denied private insurance altogether.
These problems might be addressed by improving access to affordable
Improved vehicles for health savings
may need to be considered in the
context of the broader retirement
savings problem.
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coverage in the nongroup market, by extending COBRA protections to cover
retirees for a longer interval after leaving employment, or by allowing re-
tirees to purchase coverage through Medicare or another public program.
Nongroup market reforms — Options to improve access to private in-
surance have been discussed for many years and continue to be advanced
in the context of proposals that would provide tax credits or other finan-
cial assistance with the cost of premiums. These options, including stron-
ger regulation of the nongroup market, high-risk pools or reinsurance
arrangements, or allowing enrollment through the FEHB program or a
similar system, are generally meant to apply to the entire uninsured popu-
lation, including active workers without employer coverage and retirees.
The general problem of access to insurance is beyond the scope of this
paper; an NHPF background paper, Fundamentals of Underwriting in the
Nongroup Health Insurance Market: Access to Coverage and Options for Re-
form, provides an overview of the issues and possible solutions.53
Extended COBRA coverage — Under rules established by the Consoli-
dated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985, people who
lose coverage under an employer plan usually may continue to buy cov-
erage through the employer group for a specified period—18 months, in
the case of those losing coverage because of early retirement or other ter-
mination of employment.54 Employers are permitted to charge COBRA
participants 102 percent of their average cost for active workers in the
same plan. (Higher charges are allowed for certain participants receiving
extended coverage as a result of a disability.)
The 18-month limit means that someone retiring before the age of 63 and
one-half may face some period of uninsurance before qualifying for Medi-
care. Some proposals would allow a longer period of COBRA coverage
for retirees. In the 109th Congress, S. 1826 would allow workers retiring
at age 62 or later to buy COBRA coverage for up to 36 months—that is,
until they qualify for Medicare. Because these retirees are likely to cost
more than other COBRA participants, the bill would allow employers to
charge 120 percent, rather than 102 percent, of average annual costs.
Dependents who lose employer coverage when the policyholder quali-
fies for Medicare can currently buy COBRA coverage for a maximum of
36 months. However, in 2004, 40 percent of married couples had an age
difference greater than three years, meaning that many spouses of people
turning 65 would lose COBRA before they themselves became Medicare-
eligible.55 Spouses of Medicare beneficiaries could be allowed to extend
COBRA coverage until they reached Medicare age.
COBRA coverage is expensive for participants because they pay the full
premium without an employer contribution. A single retiree in 2005
would face an average premium of $4,104, compared with an average
employee contribution for an active worker of $610. A retiree wishing
to cover all family members would pay an average of $11,098.56 Partly
Background Paper
February 8, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 26
as a result, a 2004 survey of 173 employers found that only one in five
eligible employees purchases COBRA on leaving employment. 57 There
have been a variety of proposals to encourage take-up of COBRA by
people who would otherwise be uninsured through tax credits or other
premium subsidies, and surveys have found that a generous subsidy
could more than double participation.58 One bill in the 109th Congress,
H.R. 4173, would provide a refundable tax credit to pay up to 50 per-
cent of the COBRA premium.
COBRA is also costly for employers. The minority of eligible people who
choose to buy COBRA are likely to be those who expect above average
health care expenses. One survey found that average claim costs for
COBRA participants were 46 percent higher than for active workers.59
The disparity might be greater for the older participants who would want
COBRA benefits if some form of extended coverage were made available
for non-Medicare retirees. Employers could be allowed to charge a higher
premium to this group, as they now can for disabled COBRA participants.
But this would make the coverage even less affordable for potential par-
ticipants, or would require larger premium subsidies.
Medicare buy-in — There have been numerous proposals to allow non-
Medicare retirees to buy Medicare coverage until they become Medicare-
eligible. The Clinton administration repeatedly proposed a buy-in for
people aged 62 to 64. The last of these proposals, in the fiscal year 2001
budget, would have required participants to pay a premium equal to
their full average projected costs, and a tax credit would have covered
25 percent of the premium. 60 In the 109th Congress, H.R. 2072 would
allow people aged 55 to 64 who were ineligible for other federal cover-
age to buy Medicare. A refundable income tax credit would cover 75
percent of the premium. For applicants with existing retiree coverage,
the employer could choose to pay the remaining 25 percent and cover
non-Medicare services.
The size of the premium, net of any subsidy, would affect both the level
of participation and the extent to which Medicare would displace exist-
ing employer and nongroup benefits. A 2002 study analyzed a plan that
would cover only people aged 62 to 64 and would be closed to people
eligible for employer-based coverage. It found that about 37 percent of
eligible people would participate if rates were equal to average costs;
most participants would be middle-income and would shift from private
nongroup coverage. With income-based subsidies, participation would
increase to 52 percent, with higher participation by low-income people.
The more costly the plan, the more likely it would attract people with
health problems, raising the possibility of adverse selection and a pre-
mium spiral.61 On the other hand, a generous subsidy might make the
buy-in much more attractive than most employer-provided retiree cover-
age. It could also lead most retirees buying private nongroup coverage to
shift into Medicare, raising federal costs and prompting resistance from
the insurance industry.
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Measures to make insurance coverage more accessible for retirees with-
out employer benefits might have two potentially undesirable effects. First,
they might hasten the erosion of employer coverage; future retirees who
were confident they could get other insurance might prefer other com-
pensation in lieu of health benefits. Second, they could lead more work-
ers to retire early: many people keep working until they are eligible for
Medicare precisely because they are concerned about access to health in-
surance.62 More early retirements could have financial effects on Social
Security and could also mean that more retirees would ultimately outlive
their own savings.
On the other hand, some people retire early because they are no longer
able to do their jobs, even though they may not meet the stringent criteria
for Social Security and Medicare disability coverage. Moreover, if older
workers could be sure of access to health insurance, many would not
retire but would instead shift to other jobs or self-employment.63 Reliance
on employer benefits may keep them locked into their current jobs, with
negative consequences for both workers and employers.
Access to Supplemental Coverage for Medicare Retirees
Even with the new prescription drug benefit, Medicare beneficiaries
without supplemental coverage may remain exposed to very high out-
of-pocket costs. Unlike most private insurance plans, Medicare has no
out-of-pocket limit to protect against catastrophic costs. Average ben-
eficiary liability for Medicare-covered services was $832 in 2002; 8.5
percent of beneficiaries had liability of $3,000 or more.64 Currently, ben-
eficiaries without retiree health benefits may obtain supplemental cov-
erage in three ways: by buying a nongroup Medigap policy, by joining a
Medicare Advantage plan, or by qualifying for Medicaid. (Medicaid
assistance with Medicare deductibles and coinsurance is generally avail-
able only to beneficiaries with incomes below 100 percent of the federal
poverty income guideline, $9,800 for a single person in 2006.)
As was noted earlier, many Medicare beneficiaries currently receiving
employer-sponsored supplemental coverage have fairly low incomes. In
the absence of retiree coverage, they may have difficulty finding an afford-
able alternative. At age 65, a female beneficiary would pay a national aver-
age of $1,159.85 for the least generous Medigap plan.65 For a beneficiary
just above the poverty level, and hence ineligible for cost-sharing assis-
tance under Medicaid, this amounts to 12 percent of her income. Moreover,
many Medigap plans use “attained age” rating: premiums rise, at a rate
faster than inflation, as the policyholder grows older. So maintaining cov-
erage would require a steadily higher share of income over time even for
retirees’ whose income is indexed for inflation.66 Medicare Advantage plans
may provide less costly coverage at the price of restrictions on choice of
and access to providers; at this writing, comparative information on ben-
efit offerings and premiums for 2006 is not yet available. The following are
two alternatives for improving access to supplemental coverage.
Many Medigap plans
use “attained age”
rating: premiums rise,
at a rate faster than in-
flation, as the policy-
holder grows older.
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Catastrophic add-on to Medicare — Medicare could provide its own
catastrophic benefit, covering all cost-sharing once a certain out-of-pocket
limit is reached.67 To eliminate any budgetary impact, this might be a
voluntary add-on with the full cost covered through a beneficiary pre-
mium. Because Medicare’s administrative costs are much lower than those
of private insurers—about 2 percent of benefits—the coverage could be
much cheaper than an equivalent private plan. In addition, having claims
processed by one payer, rather than separately by the Medicare interme-
diary and a Medigap insurer, might be more efficient and less confusing
for beneficiaries. One recent proposal, for a comprehensive “Medicare
Extra” plan that would provide reduced coinsurance and broader pre-
scription drug benefits as well as catastrophic coverage, would likely face
resistance from insurers, who could lose a substantial market.68 A cata-
strophic add-on may meet less resistance from insurers, because the num-
ber of beneficiaries to buy such a plan might be smaller.
Access to Medigap — People who qualify for Medicare when turning 65
have a one-time Medigap open enrollment opportunity: carriers may not
refuse or limit coverage to applicants during the first six months follow-
ing their Medicare enrollment. (Beneficiaries who decline Medigap on
turning 65 because they have employer coverage have an open enroll-
ment opportunity later on if the employer terminates the coverage.) This
rule does not apply to younger beneficiaries qualifying for Medicare as a
result of disability; Medigap carriers are free to decline coverage to
nonelderly beneficiaries because of health status or medical history. Newly
eligible disabled beneficiaries could be given the same open enrollment
option as the elderly. Insurers would resist this change; the different treat-
ment of nonelderly beneficiaries exists in the first place because insurers
fear attracting too many high-risk enrollees. On the other hand, Medicare
Advantage plans are already required to accept both elderly and disabled
applicants at all times without regard to health status. A change in the
rules for the disabled might just level the playing field.
CONCLUSION
Over one-third of retirees are now receiving some form of employer health
coverage, but many firms that have offered these benefits are reducing
their commitments to future retirees (especially those most recently hired),
and most newer employers are not offering retiree benefits at all. This
report has considered three sets of options for helping future retirees meet
their health care costs:
Stronger regulation of retiree health benefits in exchange for improved
prefunding arrangements — If employers were willing to participate,
this approach would protect workers who are trading some current com-
pensation for future coverage and would allow them to plan for retirement
with some confidence about what the employer will be providing. How-
ever, the very development that makes this option feasible—the shift from
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open-ended employer commitments to fixed-dollar limits on future ben-
efits—means that the coverage locked in would defray only a fraction of
the retirees’ future costs.
Incentives to save for future health costs — Existing tax-favored sav-
ings programs could be modified, or new vehicles developed, to en-
courage workers to set aside money for future expenses. However, many
workers are not saving enough to meet general living expenses in re-
tirement. Unless new health savings options lead to increases in overall
savings, the effect might simply be to earmark a portion of current sav-
ings for one specific category of future spending.
Alternative sources of affordable insurance — Improving access to
private coverage or broadening coverage under public programs could
help both retirees who are losing employer-sponsored coverage and those
who never had it in the first place. However, development of attractive
alternatives could speed the erosion of employer coverage. It could also
induce workers under age 65 to retire sooner.
The problem of retiree health benefits may be seen as arising from the
convergence of two larger social policy concerns: steadily rising medical
costs and the general inadequacy of savings for living expenses in retire-
ment, including health care and long-term care. Some analyses (perhaps
using pessimistic assumptions) suggest that future retirees will need to
accumulate hundreds of thousands of dollars to meet their expected medi-
cal costs. If these estimates are correct, neither direct health-related sav-
ings nor the indirect savings represented by retiree health benefits are
likely to be much help. Conversely, if people reach retirement age with-
out sufficient overall resources to meet their probable lifetime needs, ear-
marking limited savings for health care might leave them even less able
to maintain their quality of life.
The specific solutions discussed in this paper might provide relief to cur-
rent retirees or some workers just reaching retirement age. Assuring health
and income security for the next generation of retirees will require ad-
dressing the underlying problems of medical costs and savings.
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